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Exploring the Connection between 
Immigration and Violent Crime Rates  
in U.S. Cities, 1980–2000 
Graham C. Ousey, College of William & Mary
Charis E. Kubrin, George Washington University
A popular perception is that immigration causes higher crime rates. Yet, historical and contemporary 
research finds that at the individual level, immigrants are not more inclined to commit crime than the native 
born. Knowledge of the macro-level relationship between immigration and crime, however, is characterized by 
important gaps. Most notably, despite the fact that immigration is a macro-level social process that unfolds over 
time, longitudinal macro-level research on the immigration-crime nexus is virtually nonexistent. Moreover, while 
several theoretical perspectives posit sound reasons why over-time changes in immigration could result in higher 
or lower crime rates, we currently know little about the veracity of these arguments. To address these issues, this 
study investigates the longitudinal relationship between immigration and violent crime across U.S. cities and 
provides the first empirical assessment of theoretical perspectives that offer explanations of that relationship. Find-
ings support the argument that immigration lowers violent crime rates by bolstering intact (two-parent) family 
structures. Keywords: immigration, violent crime, demographic transitions, family structure, drug markets.
Nearly 80 years ago, criminologist Edwin Sutherland (1924, 1934) highlighted immigra-
tion and crime as an area of popular misconception and policy distortion. Today, not much 
has changed as both public opinion about immigration and immigration policy appear to be 
driven more by stereotype than by empirical fact (Martinez and Lee 2000). Ruben Rumbaut 
and Walter Ewing (2007) note: “The misperception that the foreign born, especially illegal 
immigrants, are responsible for higher crime rates is deeply rooted in American public opin-
ion and is sustained by media anecdote and popular myth” (p. 3; see also Hagan, Levi, and 
Dinovitzer 2008:96).
In contrast to common perception, a rapidly expanding literature reports that immigrants 
are less criminally involved than their native-born counterparts (Hagan and Palloni 1999; 
Martinez 2002). Based on an extensive review of the literature, Ramiro Martinez and Mat-
thew Lee (2000) conclude: “The major finding of a century of research on immigration and 
crime is that . . . immigrants nearly always exhibit lower crime rates than native groups” 
(p. 496). This finding of lower immigrant criminality is evident across studies that focus on 
several outcomes including crime and incarceration (e.g., Butcher and Piehl 1998b; Sampson, 
Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005). Thus, the salient question of whether immigrants have a 
greater propensity to commit crime than the native born appears to be no, although by no 
means is this answer definitive.
But the immigration-crime research picture remains incomplete. First, unlike the abun-
dance of research on the individual-level association between immigrant status and criminal 
offending, there exists a comparative shortage of research on the macro-level relationship 
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between immigration and crime rates (Mears 2001; Reid et al. 2005). This is problematic be-
cause immigration is an aggregate-level phenomenon whose effects may extend far beyond 
the simple thesis that immigrants are more crime prone than nonimmigrants. Indeed, there 
are good reasons to suspect that immigration affects demographic, economic, and social struc-
tures in ways that will impact overall crime rates, net of any differences in the individual-level 
offending of immigrants and natives (Reid et al. 2005).
Second, the relative scarcity of macro-level research is compounded by a near absence 
of longitudinal research on the immigration-crime nexus. In fact, although immigration is 
fundamentally a process of social change that unfolds over time, most prior aggregate-level 
studies on immigration and crime are cross-sectional. This is a serious limitation because 
cross-sectional analysis is best suited for analyzing whether stable features of aggregate social 
units are correlated with one another (i.e., stock effects) not how temporal change in one 
social process affects change in another (i.e., flow effects). Moreover, ample evidence suggests 
there are differences in the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of macro-social predictors 
on crime (Cantor and Land 1985, 2001; Chiricos 1987; Marvell and Moody, Jr. 1991; Phillips 
2006a), which makes it clear that we cannot make generalizations about the longitudinal 
immigration-crime relationship from extant cross-sectional research.
Third, prior macro-level research is limited by the fact that theories of the immigration-
crime relationship have not been sufficiently evaluated. Indeed, although there are multiple 
explanatory frameworks that posit plausible mechanisms by which immigration may affect 
change in crime, indicators representing those frameworks often have not been collectively 
included within macro-level studies (Mears 2002:284). Perhaps more importantly, prior ag-
gregate studies have not assessed whether salient social factors mediate the immigration-crime 
relationship in the manner predicted by prominent theoretical arguments.
In the present study, we seek to advance the literature on the connection between immi-
gration and crime by attending to these limitations. Specifically, we investigate the impact of 
change in measures of immigration on change in serious crime for 159 U.S. cities from 1980 
through 2000. We also address important theoretical limitations by empirically testing the 
efficacy of several alternative explanations of the temporal nexus between immigration and 
crime. In particular, we examine the extent to which within-city, over-time change in mea-
sures drawn from these explanatory models can account for (i.e., mediate) the longitudinal 
relationship between immigration and violent crime. Before describing our research design 
and discussing the results, we begin by outlining potential explanations for the immigration-
crime relationship. We follow that with a summary of what has been learned from prior re-
search on the immigration-crime nexus.
Conceptual Framework
Despite popular perception that immigration and crime go hand in hand, there are sound 
reasons to believe that immigration can impact social life in ways that either increase or de-
crease crime rates. We first review those perspectives that suggest immigration leads to more 
crime. Then we review those that suggest the opposite—that increased immigration results in 
less crime.
Perspectives Positing a Positive Immigration-Crime Relationship
Demographic Transition and Population Instability One framework theorizing a positive longi-
tudinal relationship highlights the fact that immigration leads to demographic transitions that 
affect crime rates. There are two variants of the demographic transition framework, with each 
emphasizing somewhat different causal mechanisms. The first argument is compositional. It 
suggests that immigration increases crime rates by raising the share of the population with a 
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“crime-prone” demographic profile. A firmly established criminological finding is that crime 
follows a distinctive age pattern with offending rates being highest among teens and young 
adults (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983). Another well-established “crime-fact” is that males are 
involved in crime, especially violent crime, at significantly higher rates than females (Pastore 
and Maguire 2008). Thus, to the extent that immigration increases the percentage of the 
population that is young and male, crime rates will increase. Consistent with that logic, evi-
dence from the 2000 Census suggests that compared to the native-born population, a higher 
proportion of recent immigrants are male (51.4 percent versus 48.9 percent) and in the 15 to 
34 year age range (53.7 percent versus 26.8 percent) (U.S. Census Bureau 2001).
The second demographic transition argument is contextual and it draws from the so-
cial disorganization framework, particularly early formulations of that theoretical perspective 
(e.g., Shaw and McKay 1969). As traditionally conceptualized, social disorganization theory 
contends that crime rates will rise when rapid social change breaks down the social networks 
and institutions necessary for effective socialization and behavioral regulation. One change 
believed to contribute to social disorganization is population instability. As a major driver of 
population change and residential instability, immigration may thus be regarded as a critical 
factor behind the breakdown of informal social control and concomitant increases in crime 
rates (Bankston 1998; Lee, Martinez and Rosenfed 2001; Lee and Martinez 2002; Mears 2002; 
Reid et al. 2005). In essence, this argument asserts that immigration creates population turn-
over and instability, which lead to more crime. It should be noted that a key distinction be-
tween the two demographic transition hypotheses is the latter suggests that increased immi-
gration will lead to higher crime rates among all population groups, while the former suggests 
the increase will be confined to the recent foreign born.
Labor Market Structure and Economic Deprivation A second set of perspectives supporting a 
positive association between changes in immigration and crime highlight the role of economic 
opportunities and economic deprivation. One strand of this viewpoint posits that immigration 
elevates crime by increasing the share of the population with low educational attainment, 
marginal labor market skills, and poor employment prospects. Research documents that re-
cent waves of immigrants are less skilled than both earlier immigrants and natives (Butcher 
and Piehl 1998a:461; see, for example, Borjas 1990). This lack of human capital dampens 
their job prospects and also may narrow their residential options. Consequently, many immi-
grants are channeled into neighborhoods located in or around urban ghettos (Hagan and Pal-
loni 1999; Shaw and McKay 1969; Thomas and Znaniecki 1920) where they are more likely 
exposed to unemployment, poverty, and sundry social ills associated with contexts of severe 
economic deprivation. Immigrants may thus come to the realization that opportunities for at-
taining economic success via legitimate avenues are bleak. According to opportunity structure 
theory, that realization can lead to strain and frustration, which will heighten the probability 
of adaptive responses that involve alternative economic pursuits, such as crime (Lee et al. 
2001:561; Mears 2002:284; Reid et al. 2005:759).
While an influx of low-skilled immigrants may, in general, contribute to rising unem-
ployment and poverty rates, more recent waves of immigration may be particularly likely 
to produce such outcomes. This is because the urban labor market structure encountered by 
immigrants in recent decades is distinct from that faced by immigrants during other periods of 
mass immigration in American history:
Whereas earlier European immigrants entered American cities at a time when manufacturing jobs 
were plentiful and provided a means of upward mobility, new immigrants must confront an “hour-
glass economy” that bifurcates opportunities for employment between menial low-wage jobs at the 
bottom and high-skill professional and technical jobs at the top and provides very limited opportu-
nities for immigrants to advance beyond the bottom rung of the economic ladder without substan-
tial investments in human capital and acquisition of requisite social networks (Morenoff and Astor 
2006:38).
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The implication of this newer economic order is that the “Americanization” experience of re-
cent arrivals, in some cases, parallels the experience of similarly situated African Americans or 
Latinos (Martinez, Lee, and Nielsen 2004:135). That is, assimilation into American life may not 
involve the desired trajectory of upward mobility but instead may be “downward,” involving 
sustained exposure to economic deprivation and a deviant lifestyle (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; 
Rumbaut et al. 2006:73). In short, while immigrants generally face tough economic hurdles in 
the assimilation process, immigrants entering during the most recent waves may be especially 
vulnerable to the types of economic deprivation associated with greater crime and violence.
The above argument focuses on how a lack of human capital among immigrants creates 
disadvantages in the labor market that ultimately lead to their own involvement in crime. A 
broader related thesis suggests that immigration may affect economic deprivation and crime 
among nonimmigrants as well. This viewpoint contends that immigration increases crime by 
changing the overall structure of local labor markets (Reid et al. 2005). For example, research 
suggests that increased immigration produces a new pool of low-skill, low-wage labor that 
competes with and may displace existing low-skill workers (Beck 1996; Waldinger 1997). As 
a result, displaced groups face greater deprivation, which may elevate their involvement in 
crime (Wilson 1996). Immigration also may increase overall levels of economic deprivation by 
driving up the supply of low-skill labor and driving down the base wage among all low-skill 
workers. Meanwhile, the surplus of low-skill workers rendered by immigration may simulta-
neously increase unemployment rates. These deleterious effects of immigration on wages and 
employment rates may increase the demand for public welfare services beyond the capacity 
of existing resources, which would only exacerbate further the experience of economic de-
privation. In sum, this latter argument suggests that by increasing unemployment, depressing 
wages, and straining public welfare resources, temporal increases in immigration may con-
tribute to higher crime rates among both low-skilled native-born workers as well as among 
immigrants themselves (Butcher and Piehl 1998a).1
Illegal Drug Markets Several studies document that recent trends in crime are linked to 
changes in illicit drug markets (Baumer et al. 1998; Fryer et al. 2005; Levitt 2004; Ousey and 
Lee 2002, 2004, 2007). Researchers have argued the proliferation of crack-cocaine markets 
during the 1980s produced a volatile marketplace that contributed to higher rates of violent 
crime. The volatility of these drug markets emanated from several sources. First, the rush to 
capitalize on this emergent economic opportunity was substantial and competition-related 
conflict was fairly prevalent. Second, due to the illegality of the enterprise, drug market con-
flicts were less likely to be resolved through legal dispute resolution mechanisms and more 
likely to be handled with personal aggression than conflicts that occurred within legitimate 
businesses. Third, drug market activities commonly took place in open-air street markets that 
exposed sellers and buyers to high risks of robbery and assault, which contributed to an “on-
guard” posture and the frequent carrying of firearms (Blumstein 1995; Jacobs 2000). And 
finally, these markets developed in economically disadvantaged areas where attenuated infor-
mal social controls exacerbated their tendency toward violence (Ousey and Lee 2002, 2004).
There are numerous reasons to suspect the proliferation of drug markets may be a salient 
intervening mechanism linking immigration to changes in crime rates. Considering long-stand-
ing stereotypes, Martinez (2002) notes a popular perception is that Latinos are heavily involved 
in drug trafficking and the concomitant violence it generates. He claims this stereotype is both 
reflected in, and reinforced by, blockbuster Hollywood films such as Scarface (1983), Carlito’s Way 
1. We acknowledge there are other possible links between immigration and economic outcomes. In addition to 
research showing deleterious outcomes (Borjas 2003; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997), there is also evidence that im-
migration may produce beneficial impacts for some labor market sectors and native-born groups (Pedace 2006). However, 
given these alternative arguments are still debated in the labor economics literature and given the nascent state of 
longitudinal immigration-crime research, we believe it prudent at this point to limit our focus to the most prominent 
immigration-labor market thesis discussed above. We leave it to future work to extend our efforts in this regard.
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(1993), and Traffic (2001), which depict the drug trade and gang activity as pervasive in Latino 
communities. Despite common stereotypes, empirical research in this area is not well developed. 
In one of the few studies that does exist, Martinez (2002) reports evidence that Latinos are not 
over-involved in drug- and gang-related violence (see also Martinez, Nielsen, and Lee 2003).
While acknowledging that the disproportionate involvement of immigrants in the drug 
trade may be more myth than fact, we also argue there are structural reasons supporting the 
notion that immigration, drug markets, and violence may be connected. As explained earlier, 
many immigrants enter the United States with relatively low levels of human capital, which 
exposes them to tough sledding in the post-industrial labor market. Hence, it is plausible that 
illegitimate opportunity structures such as the illegal drug trade are particularly appealing av-
enues of economic success for immigrants who encounter difficulties locating work in legitimate 
industries. Moreover, given that immigrants disproportionately settle in economically disad-
vantaged neighborhoods, it is likely they face greater exposure to the promises (and pitfalls) of 
open-air drug markets. Finally, because new immigrants are disproportionately young and male, 
they fit the demographic profile of individuals recruited to participate in crack-cocaine markets 
(Blumstein 1995). Indeed, some scholars contend that Latino gangs in California heavily recruit 
drug market participants from recently arrived immigrant pools, particularly illegal immigrants 
from Mexico and Central America (Mac Donald 2004). It has also been reported that service in 
the drug trade is one way that illegal immigrants pay off debts to the Latino gangs that helped 
arrange their transit from Mexico to the United States (Mac Donald 2004).
In sum, there are several conceptual arguments that proffer reasons why immigration will 
produce increases in rates of crime and violence over time. Some of these perspectives focus 
on the behavior of immigrants themselves, while others suggest that rising crime rates reflect 
the behavior of both immigrants and the native born. Although each explanation provides a 
rationale consistent with the popular perception of a positive relationship between immigra-
tion and crime, much empirical evidence—particularly at the individual level—contradicts 
that perception. This conflicting evidence calls for conceptual arguments that explain the pos-
sibility of a negative association between immigration and crime. In the following section, we 
discuss such arguments.
Perspectives Positing a Negative Immigration-Crime Relationship
Immigrant Selection Effects Several explanatory frameworks posit that over-time increases 
in immigration will contribute to less crime and violence. The first argument suggests that 
immigrants are not necessarily a random cross-section of the sending population but are a 
self-selected group with relatively high levels of achievement ambition and low criminal pro-
pensity (Butcher and Piehl 2005). As Michael Tonry (1997:21) argues, many immigrants are 
highly motivated to come to the United States to pursue economic and educational opportuni-
ties that are not available in their home countries. They seek to build better lives, are willing to 
work hard, defer short-term gratification in the interest of longer-term advancement, and are 
likely to avoid actions that put them in opposition to mainstream norms and values of Ameri-
can society. Moreover, some immigrant groups (e.g., Koreans) arrive in the United States 
better educated than the average native-born American and are therefore more qualified to 
find jobs in the primary labor market (Alba and Nee 1997). In essence, because immigration 
is often an arduous process that takes considerable planning and resources, those who immi-
grate are more likely to be selected from the low end of the criminal propensity distribution 
and therefore, rising immigration levels should bolster the low-criminality segment of the U.S. 
population, leading to less crime over time.
Formal Social Control A second argument that increased immigration will result in lower 
crime rates focuses on the formal social control response to immigration flows. This viewpoint 
posits that because of stereotypes regarding immigrant criminality, an increase in immigration 
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will propagate fear and concern about a worsening “crime problem.” Fear and concern among 
the general public will, in turn, put pressure on elected officials, local governments, and law en-
forcement leaders to respond to this perceived problem. One common response is to bolster the 
local formal social control apparatus. The most straightforward and visible way to do this may 
be to hire additional police officers to patrol the streets and deter the crimes that immigration is 
believed to engender. Some longitudinal research evidence suggests that increasing the police 
force size contributes to lower crime rates (Levitt 2004; Marvell and Moody, Jr. 1996). Thus, a 
plausible hypothesis is that temporal increases in immigration contribute to decreases in crime 
and violence by expanding the formal social control capacity (i.e., police officers per capita).
Social Capital and Family Structure A final perspective that posits a negative relationship 
between immigration and crime focuses on the levels of social capital and informal social con-
trol that tend to characterize communities populated by immigrants. Decades ago, Donald Taft 
(1933:72) argued that immigrant “ghettos” can serve a protective function by dampening cul-
ture conflict and preserving “old world” mechanisms of informal social control. More recently, 
this argument has been made with respect to ethnic enclaves. Ethnic enclaves may encourage 
cultural preservation, promote or maintain family ties and social networks, provide employ-
ment and entrepreneurial opportunities, and bolster informal social control, all of which help 
curb crime (see Desmond and Kubrin forthcoming for a detailed discussion). In their study 
of a New Orleans Vietnamese enclave, Min Zhou and Carl Banskton (2006) provide empiri-
cal evidence in support of this argument: “We found that although Vietnamese young people 
lived in a socially marginal local environment they were shielded from the negative influences 
of that environment by being tightly bound up in a system of ethnic social relations providing 
both control and direction” (pp.119–20). Along these lines, it has been argued that illegal im-
migrants’ relatively limited involvement in crime can be explained, in part, by social support 
in ethnic communities (Engbersen and van der Leun 2001:51).
An extension of this argument, reflecting more recent formulations of social disorganiza-
tion theory, claims the positive benefits of immigration are not confined to the immigrants 
residing in enclaves. Recall that early versions of social disorganization theory suggested an 
influx of immigrants into an area weakens informal social control and increases crime. In line 
with more contemporary versions of the theory, Lee and Martinez (2002) advance an im-
migrant revitalization thesis suggesting that an increase in immigration instead fosters social 
control, thereby reducing crime. Martinez (2006) notes:
Contemporary scholars are now more open to the possibility that an influx of immigrants into disad-
vantaged and high-crime communities may encourage new forms of social organization and adaptive 
social structures. Such adaptations may mediate the negative effects of economic deprivation and 
various forms of demographic heterogeneity (ethnic, cultural, social) on formal and informal social 
control, thereby decreasing crime (p. 10; see also Lee and Martinez 2002:366; Lee et al. 2001:564).
Empirical support for this argument is documented by Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick 
(1993), who find that rather than causing community disorganization, immigrants stabilized 
and revitalized Miami’s economic and cultural institutions.
An unresolved issue for the revitalization thesis focuses on identifying which salient 
changes brought on by immigration ultimately contribute to declining rates of crime and vio-
lence. One possibility is that immigration itself contributes to a revitalization of the economy 
in places where immigrants settle. In contrast to the view that immigrants increase the size of 
the economically marginal population and add strain to existing public services, this argument 
suggests that immigrants bring new energy, skills, and entrepreneurial spirit into their com-
munities. As a result, they may work to lower unemployment and poverty rates and improve 
the vitality of economic institutions.
Another strand of this argument suggests that immigration alters aggregate family and 
household structures in ways that strengthen informal social control and impede crime. The 
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segmented assimilation model, for example, suggests that contemporary immigrant commu-
nities erect important social networks that fortify traditional intact (two-parent) family struc-
tures and support the legitimacy of parental authority norms (Martinez et al. 2004). Related to 
this, scholars argue that many immigrant groups have a more familistic and pro-nuptial cul-
tural orientation than the native born (e.g., Fukuyama 1993; Oropesa 1996; Oropesa, Lichter 
and Anderson 1994; Vega 1990, 1995; Wildsmith 2004). According to David Brooks (2006), 
“[I]mmigrants themselves are like a booster shot of traditional morality injected into the body 
politic . . . They have traditional ideas about family structure, and they work heroically to 
make them a reality.” In accordance with this logic, research finds that despite experiencing 
higher rates of the types of economic deprivation that impede marriage, immigrant groups 
such as Mexican Americans have comparable marriage rates to non-Hispanic whites (Oropesa 
and Landale 2004; Oropesa et al. 1994; Sampson et al. 2005) and place greater value on 
marriage than do non-Hispanic whites (Oropesa and Gorman 2000). To the extent that im-
migrants have greater intact family structures and pro-family cultural orientations, it is likely 
that increasing immigration will lead to less crime. Indeed, criminologists have long docu-
mented that areas with higher rates of single-parent families and higher divorce rates experi-
ence more crime, presumably because the breakdown in traditional family structures deplete 
social capital and attenuate socialization and informal social control processes (Land, McCall 
and Cohen 1990; Ousey 2000; Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989; Shihadeh and 
Steffensmeier 1994). To summarize, the above discussion leads to a hypothesis that temporal 
increases in immigration result in lower crime rates, in part by reducing family disruption.
Prior Research
The Immigration-Crime Relationship
Documented scholarly interest in the connection between immigration and crime goes 
back more than a century but attention devoted to the issue has been intermittent. Indeed, 
investigations of immigration and crime have varied along with immigration itself. When im-
migration flows have been high, scholarship has flourished; when immigration flows have 
been low, scholarship has waned (Stowell 2007). Reviewing research from the past century, 
several observations are particularly noteworthy.
First, the vast majority of research focuses on the question of whether immigrants have 
higher crime, arrest, and incarceration rates than native-born individuals. In general, the an-
swer to this individual-level question is no. Going back over seven decades, the National Com-
mission on Law Observance and Enforcement—commonly known as the Wickersham Com-
mission—reported that in proportion to their numbers, the foreign born commit considerably 
fewer crimes than the native born. Contemporary empirical studies as well as comprehensive 
literature reviews continue to find that crime, arrest, and incarceration levels are lower among 
immigrants (Butcher and Piehl 1998b:654; Hagan and Palloni 1999:629; Martinez and Lee 
2000; McCord 1995; Tonry 1997).
A related observation from prior research is that the individual level link between immigrants 
and crime appears to wane across generations. That is, the children of immigrants who are born in 
the United States exhibit much higher crime rates than their parents (Morenoff and Astor 2006:36; 
Rumbaut et al. 2006:72; Sampson et al. 2005; Taft 1933; Zhou and Bankston 1998), suggesting 
one part of the “Americanization” process involves increased crime and incarceration levels.
Second, and shifting focus from the individual-level immigrant-crime question to the 
central concern of this research—the macro-level immigration-crime relationship—it is ap-
parent that findings from extant studies are more inconsistent (see Table 1 for a summary of 
aggregate-level studies on the immigration-crime relationship). For example, in their analysis 
of metropolitan areas, Lesley Williams Reid and colleagues (2005) report that the bivariate 
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association between immigration and crime varies from negative to positive to nil depending 
on which measures of immigration and crime are used. And in their multivariate analyses, 14 
of the 16 immigration-crime regression coefficients are not statistically significant. Of the two 
that are, one suggests that metropolitan areas with a higher percentage of recent immigrants 
have lower homicide rates while the other indicates that a greater percentage of Asian foreign 
born is linked to lower larceny rates. Likewise, in their analysis of metropolitan areas, Kristin 
Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl (1998a) find that the flow of recent immigrants is positively 
associated with the level of crime but that it has no effect on changes in the crime rate. Finally, 
in a study of 111 cities, Martinez (2000) reports that Latino immigration has no relationship 
with overall Latino homicide rates, a positive association with Latino felony-murder rates, and 
a negative relationship with Latino acquaintance-murder rates.
Results from research on neighborhoods also exhibit inconsistency, particularly when the 
results are compared across cities. In their analysis of drug-related homicides in Miami and 
San Diego, Martinez and colleagues (2004) find the share of the population that immigrated 
in the 1980s is unrelated to drug homicides in Miami but is positively related to such offenses 
in San Diego. In addition, the percentage of immigrants who entered the United States in the 
1960s is negatively related to drug homicides in both cities, and the percentage of immigrants 
who entered in the 1970s is unrelated to drug homicides in either city. In a related study 
that focuses on the immigration-homicide link in the subsection of Miami disproportionately 
populated by African Americans and Haitians, Lee and Martinez (2002:374) discover that the 
magnitude of the negative immigration-homicide relationship is even stronger than the mod-
erate relationship observed in the city-wide regression model. In another related study focus-
ing on motive-disaggregated homicides (e.g., escalation, intimate, robbery, and drug-related) 
among Latinos and blacks in Miami and San Diego, Nielsen and associates (2005) report ad-
ditional evidence of variability in the direction, magnitude, and statistical significance level of 
a measure of the prevalence of recent immigrants. Interestingly, they find that the impact of 
immigration on homicide varies across cities for the same racial/ethnic group or across racial/
ethnic groups within the same city. And in yet one more related study where the city of El 
Paso is added to the analysis, Lee and colleagues (2001) document that the presence of recent 
immigrants in neighborhoods is significantly negatively associated with Latino homicide vic-
timization in only one (e.g., El Paso) of the three cities examined. Lee and colleagues (2001) 
also find that recent immigration has a significant negative association with black homicide 
victimization in Miami but a significant positive association with black homicide victimization 
in San Diego. Most recently, Jacob Stowell (2007), Stowell and Martinez (2007), and Mar-
tinez, Stowell, and Jeffrey Cancino (2008) all report between-city differences in the census-
tract level relationship between immigration and violence.
Two recent contextual studies, which examine the impact of immigration on violence net 
of individual characteristics (including immigrant status), support the thesis that immigration 
is negatively related to crime. Using data from Chicago, Robert Sampson, Jeffrey Morenoff, 
and Stephen Raudenbush (2005) report neighborhood-level immigrant concentration has a 
significant negative relationship with violence, controlling for individual-level characteristics. 
Likewise, using national-level data from the Census and the Add Health study, Scott Desmond 
and Charis Kubrin (forthcoming) find that communities with greater immigrant concentra-
tion generally have lower average levels of violence, but that contextual effect appears most 
salient for Hispanics, Asians, and the foreign born.
In sum, a substantial literature at the individual level indicates that, contrary to public 
opinion, immigrants are no more likely to engage in crime and violence than their native-born 
counterparts. A smaller but expanding literature at the aggregate level suggests less certainty 
with some studies documenting no relationship, some documenting a negative relationship, 
and a handful documenting a positive immigration-crime relationship. While this body of 
work provides a solid foundation for research in this area, we believe major questions and 
unresolved issues remain. Below we highlight two of the most critical.
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Limitations of Immigration-Crime Research
In our view, research on the macro-level immigration-crime nexus contains two major short-
comings that have hampered our understanding of this issue. First, theories of the connection be-
tween immigration and crime have not, to date, been adequately tested empirically. Daniel Mears 
(2002) notes: “Although several criminological theories suggest certain hypotheses about criminal 
behavior among immigrants, these remain largely undeveloped and untested” (p. 287). As a con-
sequence, Mears claims it remains unknown whether and to what extent immigration and crime 
are truly associated once covariates such as poverty, inequality, racial and ethnic composition, 
and drug and gun markets are controlled. Along these lines, we argue that while some aggregate-
level studies do include theoretically salient covariates in their models, they are typically added as 
control variables without any systematic attempt to determine whether, and to what extent, they 
mediate or help to explain the relationship between immigration and crime. This is crucial because 
the theories delineated above primarily predict that the immigration-crime relationship is indirect, 
operating through changes in demographic, economic, and family structures.
Second, past research has left unanswered the exceptionally important question of the 
longitudinal relationship between immigration and crime. As far back as the 1930s research-
ers have called for proper assessment of the dynamic relationship between immigration and 
crime (Taft 1933:69), but research in this area is overwhelmingly cross-sectional. In fact, our 
review uncovered only one published multivariate study that has examined this relationship 
longitudinally (Butcher and Piehl 1998a). In that study, Butcher and Piehl (1998a) assessed 
the relationship between changes in immigration and changes in total (index) and violent 
crime rates for a sample of metropolitan areas. They find that change in immigration is not 
related to change in crime rates. However, their analysis was restricted to only 43 cities, and 
therefore, may miss important effects of immigration occurring across a broader sample of 
urban locales. Equally important, Butcher and Piehl assessed the longitudinal immigration-
crime relationship only for the decade of the 1980s. This limitation seems particularly acute 
because the heavy influx of the foreign born in the 1990s coincided with another important 
trend—the large and unexpected drop in crime rates (Blumstein and Wallman 2000). While 
recent scholarly speculation (Sampson 2006) has proffered a link between the two temporal 
trends, rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis of that link remains in short supply.
In summary, although several additional shortcomings in the immigration and crime litera-
ture remain (see Mears 2001 for a discussion), we believe the most pressing include: (1) accurately 
investigating the direction and magnitude of the longitudinal relationship between immigration 
and crime; and (2) testing the various explanatory frameworks that posit intervening mechanisms 
by which change in immigration affects change in crime rates at the macro-level. In response to 
these limitations, the current study investigates the nature of, and theoretical explanation(s) for, 
the longitudinal immigration-crime relationship. We choose to examine the effects of immigration 
on violent crime (although, as noted below, we perform similar analyses for property crime rates 
for comparison) because public opinion on immigration and crime overwhelmingly centers on 
the idea that immigrants are violent and that increasing immigration into an area increases rates 
of violence. In particular, public perception is that immigrants are heavily involved in criminal 
gangs that frequently perpetrate assault and homicide. Immigrants are also commonly believed 
to be regular participants in the drug trade and sponsors of the violent interactions thought to be 
concomitant of illegal drug markets. Our focus on violent crime is thus intended to directly assess 
whether immigration and violence are positively associated, as popular perception suggests.
Data and Methods
Units of Analysis
Our analysis focuses on large U.S. cities observed during the 1980 to 2000 period. We include 
cities with a minimum population of 100,000 persons in 1980, 1990, and 2000. While 173 cities 
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meet these criteria, missing data reduce the number of available cities to 159. When we pool 
available 1980, 1990, and 2000 observations for each city, the total number of city-year obser-
vations in our multivariate models is 463.2
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the analysis is the violent crime rate. This rate is computed 
by summing counts of homicides, robberies, aggravated assaults, and rapes and dividing that 
sum by the city population (expressed in units of 100,000).3 Data on violent offenses are 
obtained from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) compiled by the FBI and made available by 
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of 
Michigan. To create more stable estimates, violent crime rates for each time point are based 
on the sum of three consecutive years of UCR data. In other words, the 1980 rate is computed 
on the basis of summed violent crime and population counts from the 1980 to 1982 data files, 
the 1990 rate is based on 1990 to 1992 data, and the 2000 rate is calculated with 2000 to 
2002 data.
Independent Variables
Following prior research (e.g., Lee et al. 2001; Reid et al. 2003; Sampson et al. 2005), we 
initially selected two variables as proxies for immigration. First, the percentage of the population 
made up of foreign-born persons who immigrated in the past ten years. Second, as a measure of 
linguistic isolation, we include the percentage of the population that speaks English “not well” 
or “not at all.” As one might expect, these two measures are highly correlated (r = .84). More-
over, they are highly collinear with a third variable, the percent Latino (r = .68 and r = .88, re-
spectively). We initially conceived of this latter item as an essential covariate of aggregate crime 
rates, as indicated in prior research (Butcher and Piehl 1998a; Butcher and Piehl 1998b). Yet 
high levels of covariance between the percent Latino and the two immigration items suggests 
that estimating their unique effects on crime would be difficult. Moreover, since Latinos have 
constituted the largest immigrant group entering the United States in recent decades (Martinez 
2006:9; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007:3), it is apparent that our measure of within-city change in the 
percentage Latino is, in fact, reflective of an important dimension of recent immigration. For 
these reasons, we created a three-item immigration index by summing the z-scores of these 
measures.4 The Cronbach’s alpha for the immigration index is .94.5
2. Each of the 159 cities has nonmissing data for at least one time point but a few are missing information for one 
or two decennial census years. Therefore, the total number of observations (463) is slightly less than the total number of 
cities multiplied by the total number of time points (i.e., N = 159, T = 3, N × T = 477).
3. In preliminary analyses we modeled each violent crime outcome individually. Results from those analyses are 
very similar to one another and also closely resemble the results reported in Table 2. Thus, to eliminate redundancy, 
we present results only for the summary index of violent crime. Results from models predicting specific violent crime 
measures are available on request.
4. Here we wish to note the substantive findings reported below do not hinge upon the use of the three-item 
index. If we replace the immigration index with any one of the three items, the substantive conclusions remain un-
changed. Likewise, if we substitute any combination of two of the three items, we reach the same set of conclusions. 
Those points aside, we recognize that if the single-item measures were used separately, the interpretation of results 
would vary somewhat depending upon the particular measure utilized. For example, interpretation of the results for 
the percent Latino measure would differ to some degree from the interpretation of results based on the percent recent 
foreign-born measure. Still, given the strong correlations among the items, we believe the three-item index is tapping 
an underlying immigration component and that it is not feasible to parse out and interpret each item’s unique effect. For 
these reasons, we have chosen to utilize the three-item index in the analysis reported below. Results from analyses that 
use the single-item measures are available upon request.
5. The data for these items come from Summary File 3 of the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses of Population and 
Housing (U.S. Census Bureau 1982, 1992, 2002). The lone exception is for the item measuring recent foreign born for 
the year 1980, which was obtained online from the National Historical Geographic Information System (Minnesota 
Population Center 2004).
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To the extent possible, the analyses include measures of each theoretical perspective dis-
cussed above.6 To measure the demographic transition explanations, we include three proxies 
obtained from Summary File 3 of each of the past three decennial censuses. The first is simply 
a measure of the overall city population (change). Second, we gauge residential instability 
with an item that reflects the percentage of persons (aged 5 and older) not living in the same 
house as five years ago. The third measure, percent of the population comprised of males aged 
15 to 34, is included to account for the thesis that changes in the gender and age structure of 
the population may account for changes in violent crime rates.
Four items drawn from the Census serve as proxies for the argument that changes in eco-
nomic deprivation and labor market structure are key intervening factors that link changes in 
immigration to changes in crime rates. First, we measure the percentage of persons living be-
low the government-designated poverty line. Second, we tap employment difficulties by com-
puting the percentage of civilian persons aged 16 and over who are unemployed. And third, 
to represent the decline in the industrial base and the increase in high-skill sector jobs, we 
incorporate a measure of the percent of persons working in the manufacturing industry and a 
measure of the percent of persons employed in professional or managerial occupations.
To account for the explanation that immigration may affect serious crime rates by first in-
creasing the scope of the illegal drug trade, we include a measure of the rate of arrests for the 
sale/manufacture/distribution of cocaine and opiates. Although this measure reflects law en-
forcement as well as drug market activity, past research suggests it is correlated with other mea-
sures of drug activity and serious crime, including homicide and robbery (Baumer et al. 1998; 
Fryer et al. 2005; Ousey and Lee 2002, 2004, 2007). The data for the 1980 and 1990 measure-
ments of this variable are obtained by summing three years of data (i.e., 1980 to 1982 and 1990 
to 1992) from the UCR extract file compiled by Roland Chilton and Dee Weber (2000), while 
data for the year 2000 measurement is computed from the 2000 to 2002 versions of the Uniform 
Crime Reporting Program Data: Arrests by Age, Sex and Race (FBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007).
Finally, we measure changes in family structure with two items, which are combined into 
a family instability index by taking the sum of their z-scores. The first is the percent of the 
population (aged 15+) that is divorced. The second is the percent of family households not 
headed by married couples. The within-city, over-time correlation between these measures is 
r = .88. Both items are obtained from the Census Summary File 3 (U.S. Census Bureau 1982, 
1992, 2002).
The means and standard deviations for all variables used in the analysis are presented in 
Appendix A.
Analytic Strategy
Since our interest centers on investigating the nature and explanation of the longitudinal 
relationship between immigration and violent crime, we estimate fixed-effects linear regres-
sion models via the xtreg procedure in STATA version 10. Fixed-effects (FE) models constitute 
one of several alternatives to analyzing panel data, with others including random-effects (RE) 
and generalized estimating equation (GEE) models. Generally speaking, all of these models are 
preferable estimators of longitudinal data over ordinary least squares (OLS) regression because 
their standard error estimates adjust for the fact that repeated observations on the dependent 
variable for a particular city are likely to be correlated. Moreover, all methods yield consistent 
estimates of parameters if model assumptions hold. Yet, we prefer the FE model because it 
focuses solely on the within-unit (change) variation in the variables and requires less restric-
tive assumptions than the alternative models. In our case, the RE and GEE models assume that 
6. One exception is we have no direct measure of the “self-selection” thesis. Thus, our analyses do not directly 
investigate that hypothesis. However, to the extent that the immigration index has a direct negative effect on violent 
crime rates after controls for the other theoretical models are accounted for, that result could be interpreted as consistent 
with a self-selection effect.
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time-varying explanatory variables (e.g., the immigration index) are uncorrelated with unmea-
sured city-specific, time-invariant factors (i.e., the “random-effect”), whereas the FE makes no 
such assumption. In fact, the FE method actually controls for the influence of all time-invariant 
predictors whose effects are time-stable while RE and GEE models do not.7 This means that the 
FE model controls for a key source of omitted variable bias that the RE and GEE models es-
sentially assume is not present.8 In addition to accounting for the city-specific fixed-effects, we 
also include in our models dummy variables for the years 1990 and 2000 (1980 is reference), 
which helps to account for the influence of unmeasured city-invariant, period-specific effects 
on violent crime rates. Finally, we employ the Huber/White/Sandwich or “robust” variance-
covariance matrix in our computation of standard errors. This adjustment helps to account for 
other deviations from usual “normal error” linear regression assumptions.
Results
Results from the regression models examining whether within-city, over-time change in 
immigration (and other covariates) affects within-city over-time change in violent crime rates 
are reported in Table 2. This table contains results from a series of seven regression models. The 
first column reports a baseline regression model in which change in violent crime is predicted 
only by the immigration index and time-period dummy variables. In each subsequent model, 
we progressively expand on that initial model by adding measures reflecting the theoretical 
perspectives discussed above. Consistent with our objectives, this model-building strategy al-
lows us to gauge the extent to which the observed relationship between change in immigration 
and change in violent crime is mediated—or explained—by proxies for those theories.
In the first model of Table 2 we find evidence of a statistically significant relationship 
between change in immigration and change in violent crime. Specifically, a one unit increase 
over time in the immigration index is associated with a decrease of 253 violent crimes (per 
100,000 persons). In standardized terms, these results indicate that a one standard deviation 
increase in the immigration index corresponds with a .3 standard deviation decrease in the 
violent crime rate.9 Interestingly, the direction of this coefficient contradicts popular perception 
that immigration is a major contributor of increased crime rates, but is consistent with theoreti-
cal models proffering rationales for why immigration has an inhibiting impact on violence.
In the second model, we introduce measures representing the various demographic tran-
sition explanations. Recall these arguments suggest that immigration leads to greater residen-
tial instability and a larger young male population, both of which should raise crime rates. The 
results of the second model provide very little support for that expectation. Although changes 
in residential mobility affect changes in the violent crime rate, neither changes in total popu-
lation nor the percent of males aged 15 to 34 are significantly associated with the dependent 
variable. Moreover, controlling for all three measures only marginally affects the magnitude 
of the immigration coefficient.
The third model introduces variables that tap changes in labor market structure and eco-
nomic deprivation. Generally speaking, the economic deprivation/labor market structure hy-
pothesis posits that the inflow of immigrants into the shrinking low-skill job base of the post-
industrial labor market will produce increases in poverty and unemployment rates, which 
in turn, will yield a rise in crime rates. Of the four economic deprivation and labor market 
7. Thus, important time-invariant correlates of crime—such as region—are automatically controlled in the fixed-
effects framework.
8. For an excellent discussion of the merits and potential biases of RE models for analyzing panel data, see Brame, 
Bushway, and Paternoster (1999).
9. For interested readers, supplemental analyses that include the percent recent foreign born in place of the immi-
gration index indicate that cities experiencing a one percentage point increase in the percent recent foreign born exhib-
ited, on average, a decrease of 74 violent crimes per 100,000 persons. The associated standardized coefficient is -.21.
SP5603_04.indd   461 7/9/09   2:39:17 PM
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/socpro/article-abstract/56/3/447/1707591 by Serials D
ept -- C
ollege of W
illiam
 and M
ary user on 23 Septem
ber 2019
462 Ousey/ Kubrin﻿
T
a
b
le
 2
 •
 F
ix
ed
-E
ff
ec
ts
 (
W
it
h
in
-C
it
y)
 L
in
ea
r 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 M
od
el
s 
P
re
d
ic
ti
n
g 
V
io
le
n
t 
C
ri
m
e 
R
a
te
s,
 1
9
8
0
–2
0
0
0
P
re
di
ct
or
s
M
od
el
 1
M
od
el
 2
M
od
el
 3
M
od
el
 4
M
od
el
 5
M
od
el
 6
M
od
el
 7
Im
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 i
n
d
ex
-2
5
3
.0
9
* 
(-
.3
0
)
-2
5
4
.2
4
*
(-
.3
0
)
-2
5
3
.4
9
*
(-
.3
0
)
-2
5
6
.9
6
*
(-
.3
1
)
-2
5
6
.7
5
*
(-
.3
1
)
-1
2
8
.8
3
†
(-
.1
5
)
-1
2
9
.8
6
†
(-
.1
5
)
P
er
ce
n
t 
m
al
es
, 
1
5
 t
o
 3
4
3
.6
8
(.
0
1
)
4
.3
3
(.
0
1
)
-1
1
.5
7
(-
.0
2
)
-1
2
.2
7
(-
.0
2
)
-1
0
.2
9
(-
.0
2
)
-9
.5
9
(-
.0
2
)
C
it
y 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 (
L
n
)
9
5
.3
9
(.
0
2
)
2
0
.5
4
(.
0
0
3
)
-2
5
.5
5
(-
.0
0
4
)
2
.4
0
(.
0
0
0
4
)
3
5
2
.6
0
(.
0
6
)
3
7
0
.6
4
(.
0
6
)
R
es
id
en
ti
al
 i
n
st
ab
il
it
y
8
.9
3
*
(.
0
8
)
9
.9
1
*
(.
0
9
)
9
.1
4
*
(.
0
8
)
9
.1
7
*
(.
0
8
)
7
.7
4
†
(.
0
7
)
7
.8
3
†
(.
0
7
)
P
er
ce
n
t 
be
lo
w
 p
o
ve
rt
y
-3
.0
8
(-
.0
1
)
-9
.5
5
(-
.0
4
)
-8
.8
5
(-
.0
3
)
-1
.1
5
(-
.0
0
4
)
-1
.7
6
(-
.0
0
7
)
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
1
3
.3
1
(.
0
2
)
2
6
.0
7
(.
0
4
)
2
5
.0
2
(.
0
4
)
1
6
.6
2
(.
0
2
)
1
7
.4
6
(.
0
2
)
P
er
ce
n
t 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
5
.8
3
(.
0
3
)
5
.6
9
(.
0
3
)
5
.8
0
(.
0
3
)
1
5
.0
4
(.
0
8
)
1
5
.0
0
(.
0
8
)
P
er
ce
n
t 
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
/m
an
ag
er
ia
l
-3
0
.1
7
†
(-
.1
8
)
-3
2
.3
1
*
(-
.1
9
)
-3
2
.0
0
*
(-
.1
9
)
1
1
.7
6
(.
0
7
)
1
1
.5
5
(.
0
7
)
D
ru
g 
m
ar
k
et
 a
rr
es
ts
 (
L
n
)
1
1
4
.9
6
*
(.
2
0
)
1
1
4
.6
1
*
(.
2
0
)
1
0
6
.7
5
*
(.
1
8
)
1
0
5
.6
8
*
(.
1
8
)
P
o
li
ce
 o
ffi
ce
rs
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a
3
1
.0
0
(.
0
1
)
-1
3
.4
6
(-
.0
1
)
-2
1
.4
0
(-
.0
1
)
F
am
il
y 
in
st
ab
il
it
y 
in
d
ex
4
3
2
.7
5
*
(.
6
2
)
4
1
4
.4
7
*
(.
6
0
)
P
er
ce
n
t 
bl
ac
k
6
.5
8
(.
0
2
)
Ti
m
e 
tr
en
d
 d
u
m
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
s
 
Y
ea
r 
1
9
9
0
 
1
2
9
9
.1
1
*
1
3
2
1
.9
5
*
1
4
6
5
.0
1
*
1
2
5
6
.4
7
*
1
2
4
8
.0
7
*
3
7
9
.0
2
†
3
9
8
.4
1
†
 
Y
ea
r 
2
0
0
0
1
1
8
5
.3
3
*
1
1
8
1
.4
7
*
1
5
3
5
.7
2
*
1
4
1
8
.4
8
*
1
3
9
8
.4
7
*
-2
3
1
.1
3
-2
0
0
.0
9
M
o
d
el
 s
u
m
m
ar
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
R
2
 (
w
it
h
in
-u
n
it
)
.4
2
8
.4
3
4
.4
4
0
.4
6
4
.4
6
4
.5
0
1
.5
0
1
 
C
o
rr
 (
u
i, 
X
B
)
-.
3
7
7
-.
3
6
2
-.
3
0
2
-.
2
9
0
-.
2
7
4
-.
0
7
8
-.
1
4
0
 
To
ta
l 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
bs
er
va
ti
o
n
s 
(N
 ×
 T
)
4
6
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
 
To
ta
l 
N
u
m
be
r 
C
it
ie
s 
(N
) 
 
1
5
9
1
5
9
1
5
9
1
5
9
1
5
9
1
5
9
1
5
9
*p
 <
 .
0
5
 †
p 
<
 .
1
0
 (
tw
o
-t
ai
le
d
 t
es
ts
)
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
iz
ed
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 i
n
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
SP5603_04.indd   462 7/9/09   2:39:18 PM
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/socpro/article-abstract/56/3/447/1707591 by Serials D
ept -- C
ollege of W
illiam
 and M
ary user on 23 Septem
ber 2019
 immigration and Violent Crime rates in u.s. Cities  463
structure variables entered into the equation in Model 3, only the percent employed in pro-
fessional and managerial occupations shows evidence of a statistically discernible relationship 
with the change in violent crime rates. Specifically, a unit increase in professional/manage-
rial occupation employment is associated with a drop of 30.17 (per 100,000 persons) in the 
violent crime rate. In contrast, change in manufacturing employment, poverty rates, and un-
employment rates are not significantly associated with within-city changes in violent crime 
rates. Moreover, controlling for these economic deprivation/labor market structure variables 
does not materially affect the magnitude of the association between immigration and violent 
crime. Thus, these results offer little support for the argument that immigration affects crime 
by altering economic deprivation or labor market opportunities in large U.S. cities.10
In the fourth model, we examine the thesis that immigration may contribute to changes 
in the prevalence of the illegal drug trade, with consequences for violent crime rates. Con-
sistent with the viewpoint that within-city changes in drug markets are factors in over-time 
changes in homicide (see Ousey and Lee 2002, 2004, 2007), the results suggest that increases 
in drug arrests are significantly associated with increases in the overall violent crime rate as 
well. However, despite this finding, there is little evidence that drug markets serve as a main 
process behind the longitudinal immigration-violent crime association. Indeed, the direct ef-
fect of immigration on violent crime changes very little between Models 3 and 4. Thus, al-
though changes in drug markets may be an important piece of the puzzle regarding violent 
crime trends since 1980, they do not appear to be major intervening mechanisms that link 
within-city changes in immigration to changes in violent crime rates.
Controlling for the impact of within-city changes in formal social control capacity—as 
measured by police officers per capita—also appears to have little efficacy in explaining the 
immigration-violent crime relationship. As shown in Model 5, the results indicate that within-
city over-time variation in police officers per capita has little association with temporal change 
in violent crime rates and no impact on the immigration-violent crime coefficient. Thus, our 
models do not support the thesis that immigration has influenced the number of police of-
ficers on the street, which in turn drove inter-decade changes in city-level violent crime rates 
(but see Levitt 2004; Marvell and Moody 1996).
In the sixth model, we introduce the family instability measure into the equation to assess 
the hypothesis that immigration contributes to lower crime rates by decreasing the prevalence 
of family breakdown and increasing two-parent, married households and the concomitant 
social capital that such family structures bring to communities. Consistent with this thesis, the 
results indicate that family instability has a positive relationship with the violent crime rate. 
Specifically, a one unit change in the family instability index is associated with an increase 
of nearly 433 violent crimes (per 100,000 persons). Both the t-ratio (5.54) and the standard-
ized coefficient (.62) for this variable are far and away the largest in the model, indicating a 
statistically significant and fairly strong effect of within-city over-time changes in family struc-
ture on within-city changes in violent crime rates. Equally important, the results of Model 6 
suggest that family structure is an important mediator of the effect of immigration on the 
violent crime rate. With the inclusion of the family instability index, the negative coefficient 
for the immigration index decreases by nearly 50 percent and the t-ratio drops from 3.74 to 
1.73, indicating the direct effect of immigration on violent crime is no longer significant at 
the .05 level. In sum, the results from the sixth model are consistent with the hypothesis that 
increases in the immigrant population lead to less violent crime in large part by altering family 
10. While the absence of significant effects for variables like age structure and poverty may strike some readers as 
unusual, we note that much of the macro-level empirical evidence regarding links between these variables and crime is 
drawn from cross-sectional studies of homicide rates. Longitudinal evidence of the effects on broader measures of violent 
crime is actually quite scarce. Moreover, results from longitudinal research examining the effects of similar age structure 
and poverty measures on measures of crime are decidedly mixed (cf. LaFree and Drass 1996; Marvell and Moody 1991; 
McCall, Parker, and McDonald 2008; Ousey and Lee 2002; Phillips 2006b; Worrall 2005).
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structure.11 More specifically, immigration appears to have a dampening influence on family 
instability, which in turn, lowers violent crime rates.12
Supplemental Analyses
We conducted several supplemental analyses to ensure the robustness of our findings. 
First, because it is commonly found to be a correlate of macro-level violent crime rates, we 
examined whether our findings were affected by the inclusion of a measure of change in the 
percent black population. We note the initial exclusion of this variable was rooted in theo-
retical considerations. In our view, the theoretical models we assess do not make a compel-
ling case for its inclusion. More importantly, if percent black were to be included, it is not 
obvious where within the theoretical elaboration/model-building process it would best fit. 
Indeed, while percent black is sometimes used as one indicator of economic disadvantage, it 
could arguably also proxy for immigration—to the extent immigration processes affect racial 
composition—or simply as another measure of demographic transitions. Likewise, because 
percent black has long been the main measure of racial threat processes, it can be argued that 
it should be included either with the drug arrests variable (e.g., the drug war focus on black 
communities) or with the measure of formal social control (police per capita). In short, the 
lack of theoretical specificity of percent black suggests that its inclusion with any particular 
set of explanatory variables may weaken, rather than strengthen, the measurement proper-
ties of the theoretical models that are the focus of our analysis. Nevertheless, to determine if 
our results are contingent on its inclusion, we added it to a final regression model (Model 7), 
presented in Table 2. Two results are noteworthy. First, both the direct effect of the immigra-
tion index and the effect of the family instability index remain significant after percent black 
is controlled. And second, there is no direct effect of percent black on violent crime. Thus, our 
results are generally unaffected by whether or not percent black is controlled.13
Second, we examined whether our results were sensitive to other specific modeling is-
sues. For instance, one reviewer suggested that because many cities may have very small 
immigrant populations, our analyses may be unduly affected by the inclusion or exclusion 
of “low immigration” cities. To examine this issue, we repeated our analyses after alternately 
imposing a minimum immigrant population criterion of: (1) 2,000 recent immigrants; and 
(2) 5,000 recent immigrants. Results from each set of supplemental models are substantively 
identical to those presented in Table 2.
On the advice of another reviewer, we also considered whether there was nonlinearity 
in the effect of immigration on violent crime. The logic here is that in cities with relatively 
few immigrants, the impact of a unit increase in the immigration measure may be more 
dramatic than it would be in cities where the immigrant population base is already sub-
stantial. We probed this possibility in two alternative ways. First, we estimated a model that 
included an interaction between a measure of within-city change in the immigration index 
11. Although our primary substantive interest centers on violence, we also investigated whether the immigration-
family structure-crime linkage was evident for property crime (measured as an index comprised of burglary, larceny, 
and motor-vehicle theft). As demonstrated in Appendix B, the immigration index has a significant negative effect on 
property crime rates, which becomes attenuated and—in this case—completely nonsignificant after controlling for fam-
ily instability.
12. A reviewer of an early draft of this paper argued that because “family breakdown” increased between 1980 and 
2000 (see Appendix A), the notion that immigration was working to bolster intact family structures was not supported. 
However, it should be noted that changes in the means of the family variables reflect overall trends, not immigration-
specific trends. In general, divorce rates and single-parent family households did increase over time in large cities in the 
United States. Yet, as illustrated in Appendix C, our analyses suggest that immigration countered those upward trends to 
some extent. Stated another way, if the influence of immigration was removed, the increase in divorce and single-parent 
families across the three time points would have been even more substantial than what is observed in Appendix A.
13. As shown in Appendix B, percent black does have a positive association with the property crime rate that is 
significant at the .10 level. However, other substantive results in the property models are unchanged by its inclusion.
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(deviations from the city-level mean) and a measure of the average level of immigration 
(the city-specific over-time mean of the immigration index). Second, we computed a model 
that included the immigration index and its quadratic. Not surprisingly, the results from 
both models are similar and they suggest that the immigration index has an additive, rather 
than multiplicative, effect on violent crime. In other words, the effect of a unit change in 
immigration appears to be fairly constant regardless of whether a city has a relatively small 
or large immigrant population base.14
Finally, because multicollinearity is commonly troublesome in macro-level research, 
we examined the degree to which high levels of collinearity are evident in our set of ex-
planatory variables. While some explanatory variables are moderately correlated with each 
other, no correlations are strong enough to suggest a near linear dependency. This conclu-
sion is supported by our analysis of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) computed for the 
models estimated. For example, in the final model reported as Model 7 in Table 2, the aver-
age VIF is 2.35 and all substantive variables have VIFs below 3.4. Only the VIF for the year 
2000 dummy variable is above 4 (5.13), and that finding only underscores the importance 
of controlling for the time-period fixed-effects. Interestingly, once the city- and time-specific 
fixed effects are partialled out, the VIFs for the substantive explanatory variables are quite 
low, with an average of 1.51 and a maximum of 2.28. In short, there is little indication of 
problematic multicollinearity levels that would threaten the stability or interpretability of 
the results reported above.
Summary and Conclusion
Common belief holds that immigration creates more crime and violence. This belief is 
rooted in the notion that either individual immigrants have a greater propensity for violent 
criminal behavior than natives or that an influx of foreigners disrupts existing mechanisms 
of social regulation. While this belief has held firm in the public conscience, an accumulated 
body of research has tested the idea that the foreign born and/or their offspring are more 
involved in criminal behavior than natives. Findings on this question of “immigrant crimi-
nality” generally contradict the popular belief that immigrants are particularly crime prone. 
In fact, much work suggests that first-generation immigrants engage in less criminal activity 
than natives.
In contrast to the relative clarity of findings from research at the individual level, there 
exists more uncertainty on the question of the macro-level impact of immigration on crime. 
While the logic of social disorganization theory, at least as traditionally conceptualized, has 
long provided a scientific basis for the expectation that immigration causes crime, empirical 
assessment of that hypothesis as well as other theories of the immigration-crime nexus has 
been limited. Indeed, despite a surge in immigration-crime research since 2000, the extant 
body of empirical work remains relatively small and to date has produced a somewhat incon-
sistent pattern of results. Moreover, while much theorizing about the macro-level connection 
between immigration and crime is founded on the notion that immigration is a process of 
change that affects crime rates by altering the demographic, economic, and social organization 
of society, virtually all empirical findings are based on cross-sectional analyses that do not 
measure over-time change in immigration, crime, or other relevant social factors.
To begin addressing these limitations, the current study pooled 1980, 1990, and 2000 
Census data on crime, immigration, and various demographic, economic, and social factors 
for 159 large U.S. cities to assess the nature of the longitudinal relationship between im-
migration and violent crime. Using a fixed-effects panel data regression approach, we first 
14. All supplemental analyses described herein are available from the first author.
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investigated whether within-city, over-time change in immigration was associated with with-
in-city change in a violent crime index. We then examined the efficacy of several alternative 
theories on the link between immigration and crime by assessing whether changes in factors 
such as demographic structure, economic deprivation, labor markets, illegal drug markets, 
police force capacity, and family structure could account for the observed longitudinal immi-
gration-crime association.
Our analyses yielded a number of key findings. First, unlike the long-held popular view 
that immigration is a major factor contributing to higher crime rates, our results suggest the 
opposite. The baseline regression models indicate that within-city change in immigration has 
a significant negative association with within-city change in violent crime. In other words, 
on average, cities that experienced increases in immigration from 1980 to 2000 experienced 
a decrease in violent crime rates. Second, while our results show the measure of illicit drug 
market arrests has a positive association with changes in crime rates, that consistent pattern of 
results is not repeated for most of the measures of demographic transitions, economic depriva-
tion and labor market structure, or formal social control. Indeed, among the variables reflect-
ing those arguments, we find that only the percent employed in professional and managerial 
occupations shows any consistent association with within-city changes in violent crime rates. 
Third, our analyses indicate that the city-level longitudinal immigration-crime relationship is 
not explained by the demographic transition, economic deprivation, drug market, or formal 
social control theoretical arguments evaluated in our analysis. We continue to find evidence 
of a moderate negative relationship between within-city change in the immigration index and 
within-city change in violent crime after controlling for percent young males, population size, 
residential instability, economic deprivation, labor market characteristics, illegal drug market 
activity/arrests, and the relative size of the police force.
Our analyses do, however, suggest that the family structure/social capital theoretical 
framework offers an important clue to the longitudinal immigration-crime relationship. As 
predicted by that framework, we find evidence that changes in family structure are an im-
portant factor linked to changes in violent crime. Equally important, controlling for changes 
in family structure substantially mediates the within-city immigration-crime relationship. 
That is, it appears the negative relationship between immigration and violent crime is due, 
in part, to the fact that immigration is negatively associated with divorce and single-parent 
families, which in turn, are positively related to violent crime rates. We believe these results 
buttress “immigrant revitalization” arguments that have appeared in recent scholarship on 
the impacts of immigration (Lee and Martinez 2002). At the same time, we acknowledge 
there is a plausible alternative interpretation of the results we’ve presented. Namely, it can 
be argued that our analyses show simply that after all relevant controls are included there 
is a modest and marginally significant negative effect on violent crime, with no direct effect 
observed for property crime. Although our interpretation of the data is intuitively appeal-
ing because it identifies a logical mechanism by which immigration may affect crime rates 
at the macro level, this alternative interpretation is also viable and cannot be rejected on 
empirical grounds.
On face value these findings support some tentative conclusions. One is that violent 
crime is not a deleterious consequence of increased immigration. Rather the results are 
consistent with Sampson’s (2006) recent speculation that immigration may be a key factor 
contributing to the crime drop of the 1990s. Thus, in line with the individual level finding 
that immigrants are less inclined to commit crime than the native born, our work suggests 
that the macro-level process of immigration may have notable protective effects with re-
gard to crime. A second conclusion is that immigration also may have beneficial impacts on 
important social institutions. While our findings do not indicate any clear influence of im-
migration on city economies, there certainly is evidence to support the notion that immigra-
tion may bolster the family by increasing two-parent families and lowering divorce rates in 
U.S. cities. Indeed, in a supplemental analysis shown in Appendix C, we find evidence that 
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net of controls for time trends, changes in the immigration index are negatively related to 
family instability in our sample of cities. These results are somewhat consistent with findings 
reported in other studies. For instance, in their multi-level analysis of data from Chicago, 
Sampson and colleagues (2005) report that having married parents is one of the key pro-
tective factors that help explain black/white and Mexican American/white gaps in violent 
offending—although they do not find that having married parents mediates the effect of 
immigrant status on offending.
While these conclusions suggest a positive outlook with regard to the impacts of immi-
gration, we point out that additional research on the connections among immigration, family 
structure/family values, and crime is needed. Some scholars, in fact, are sharply critical of 
the notion that immigration is driving a revitalization of the kinds of traditional family struc-
tures and values that otherwise have been steadily declining in the United States (Mac Don-
ald 2006). The crux of this counterargument is that due to Americanization, out-of-wedlock 
childbirth is quickly becoming normative among immigrants. Thus, one speculation is that as 
recent immigrants grow older and produce successive generations, pro-family cultural ele-
ments will be eroded by their sustained exposure to relatively high levels of deprivation, with 
the end result being lower marriage rates and higher rates of single parenthood. Along these 
lines, some studies find that later-generation Mexican Americans are less likely to be married 
than comparable generation non-Hispanic whites (Oropesa and Landale 2004). Simply put, 
immigration is a complex issue and though our results support the view that immigration 
has beneficial consequences in the immediate term, it remains an open question as to what 
the longer-term results will be once recent immigrants become increasingly socialized into 
American culture.
While we believe our study has begun to fill important gaps in the literature, there are 
several directions that future studies could take to expand upon our efforts. First, our work 
suggests that immigration has a negative influence on the change in violent crime rates but 
our analysis was unable to determine if those effects are general, experienced equally by the 
entire population, or are limited to certain population subgroups. Although our measures 
were computed on the basis of the total population, much insight may be gained if future 
studies are able to investigate whether there are differences in the effects of immigration on 
family structure and crime rates between different ethnic/racial groups or between immi-
grants and nonimmigrants. Likewise, an important extension to the current research involves 
attempting to isolate if the apparent beneficial impact of immigration differs by sending coun-
try or immigrant group. Clearly, there are cultural and skill differences between immigrants 
coming from, for example, the Caribbean, South America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. The 
extent to which those differences translate into varied impacts on crime as well as intervening 
demographic, economic, and family structures remains unclear.
Future research should also investigate the degree to which the longitudinal macro-level 
relationship between immigration and crime is affected by the “immigrant generation” is-
sue discussed earlier. As individual-level studies have suggested, second- and later-generation 
immigrants become more Americanized in terms of their involvement in crime than first-
generation immigrants. Thus, research that attempts to dissect the unique effects of over-time 
changes in first- and later-generation immigrant population bases on social organization and 
crime would be an essential next step in the development of the macro-level literature on the 
immigration-crime nexus.
Finally, given that past work suggests the protective effects of immigrant communities 
often are a result of the existence of enclaves, an important extension of the current research 
would be to investigate whether the impact of immigration on the change in crime rates is 
contingent upon the extent to which enclave characteristics are evident in a city. Do cities that 
have immigrant enclaves have especially lower crime rates? If so, what aspects of enclaves 
inhibit criminal activity? Answering these questions will go a long way towards empirically 
testing a key argument theorized for the negative immigration-crime relationship.
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